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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
J\JAHGARET McALLISTER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
- vs -
LA1IAR BYBEE, CARVEL MATT-
RNON, Administrator of the Estate of 
()'DP 11 ·w a ts on, Deceased, C AL I -
FORNIA-PACIFIC UTILITIES COM-
PANY, a corporation, and KANAB 
Cf'l1Y, UTAH, a municipal corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10726 
BRIJ~F OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
CALfFORNIA PACIFIC UTILITIES COMPANY, 
a corporation 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
'l'his is an action fo.r damages for personal injuries 
alh•gpd]y sustained by plaintiff when, after alighting 
from a ear at the curb, she fell as she was attempting 
to walk from the curb to the public side·walk on the 
main street of Kanab, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
Tlie trial court dismissed the action as against all 
fli'f'f•ndants at the close of plaintiff's evidence and, after 
)i,.I' motion for new trial was denied, plaintiff appealed. 
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STATEJ\fI;jNT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is incom1>letp and 
it is not supported by citations to tlw pages of tltp rrc-
ord, as required by Rule 75 (p) (2), Utah Rules of CiYil 
Procedure. Therefore, respondent California-Pacific 
Utilities Company, herein called for convenience "Pa-
cific," sets forth the following statement of the faet~, 
with supporting citations to the numbered pagrs of tlt1· 
transcript of testimony. 
Plaintiff claimed she sustained injuries in a fall 
which occu.rrPd in Kanab, rtah, on the morning of 
September lh, 1963, just after she alighted from tlw 
passenger side of her car, parked paralle>l to the curL, 
and began to walk across the area between the curh and 
the public sidewalk toward the bank when' she inten<led 
to make a deposit. The car was facing Wf'st, on tlw 
north sidf' o.f the street, and in front of property ownr1l 
by respondents Byhef' and Watson (Ex. A, Tr. 31, 3~). 
'rhe hank building was east of the ear, so that ap-
pellant was inknding to walk in a nortlwast clirPctiou. 
Between thP Bybf'e-\Vatson property and the strf'rt then· 
was a public sidt>walk, a wide curbing or parking strip 
and the eurh and guttr>r, all of which was 1mhlic prop-
Prty, own<'d h>· i·pspond<>nt Kanah Cit>- (Tr. 139). 
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'l'here was a building, immediately north o.f the side-
walk, which had been leased by Bybee and Watson to 
Pacific, and which is described in the record as the 
''light company office" (Ex. 7, Tr. 31). East of this 
hnilding, and between it and the bank, was a 14-foot 
vacant lot, also owned by Bybee and Watson (Tr. 146). 
When Bybee and 1N atson acquired their property in 
10:55, there was a canopy extending from the south side 
of thP building, out over the sidewalk to the street line. 
A srrvice station business had formerly been conducted 
in the building and there had been gasoline pumps under 
the canopy (Tr. 139). The canopy had been supported 
hy pillars, resting on concrete blocks about 18 inches 
o;quare. ..When the street was widened, the authorities 
required the building owners, Bybee and ·watson, to re-
mow the canopy and pillars. They did so, leaving the 
<.'nncrete bases intact, near the curb. These are the con-
nete blocks, which were six or eight inches high, and 
1vhich are mentioned throughout the record (Tr. 143, 
1+-t, 151 ). 
Then• was a small pipe, projecting slightly above 
tl1C' ground, just east of the easternmost cement block. 
Thi,; pipe, d<'Scribed as a water pipe, apparently had 
lH•pn u~ed in the service station business. It was in place 
]lrior to tlte time the building was leased to Pacific and, 
likP tlw cement block, was surrounded by public land 
011rn·d 11;: thP City of Kanab (Tr. 1-15, 14-6). 
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Appellant had worked for 16 years in a cafe Jia" 
l"l 
onally across the street from the point where this inC'J-
dent occurred. She had seen the cement block many times 
as she passed hy, walking to work. She had good f'Yi> 
sight and she '.Vas watching where she was going (Tr. 
43, 50). Nothing occurred in the immediate area to 
distract hrr attention as she began to walk from her car 
to the bank (Tr. 51, ;52). 
In attempting to described what had occurred, ap-
pellant testified she go.t out of the car, closed tlw door, 
started to walk "and I fell owr something, hut I don't 
know \Vhat it was" (Tr. 32). She did not know how rnam 
steps she had taken. It might have been one stc>p or it 
might have been more. She did not know which foot had 
encountered an object that caused her to stumble and 
admitted she did not know whether her foo.t "hit tlw 
cement block or the pipe or some other object in the 
area'' (Tr. 56). There was "a lot of grass around there" 
and she did not know whether there was a rock "hidden 
in the grass or weeds" that she might have stumbled 
over (Tr. 56). 
She admitted that in her deposition, taken H months 
after the incident, and about 18 months before trial, slw 
had testified that slw wasn't sure whether she had safe!Y 
negotiated the curb 01· not. Her state1mmt thrn is fonrnl 
on pag-0 17 of the devosition, quoted at page 46 of this 
record: 
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"Well, I stepped on it and I don't know wheth-
er it was right on the curb or I stepped out to 
step up on the cul"b, but I stepped out and then 
I stepped up and brought my other foot forward 
and then I went over and that's all I know and 
all I can tell you." 
Although appellant had read and signed her deposi-
tion, she had not corrected this statement. However, upon 
trial, she claimed to be more sure of what occurred and 
tl'stified she ·was "very much more sure" that she had 
safoly reached the top of the curb and had not stumbled 
over it (Tr. 47). 
Appellant had no memory of what she had actually 
dmw and she had gone back to the scene and had re-
constructed what had occurred, as is shown by the follow-
ing testimony which concluded her cross-examination: 
"Q. All right, now you went back and looked at 
this area afterwards and then you have rea-
soned from that that you must have hit one 
of these things that we've talked about; isn't 
that true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But so far as having an actual memory that 
you can tell this jury and this judge, you 
~an not say what happened; isn't that true, 
an actual memory that you can actually call 
on your mind, you can't tell us, can you 1 
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A. No." (Tr. 47, 58.) 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, the court 
granted defense motions for involuntary dismissal, upon 
the ground that plaintiff had shown no right to relief 
as against any of the defendants. 
Plaintiff filed a timely motion for new trial and 
upon its denial, this appeal followed. 
S'TAT'EMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE RESPONDENT, CALIFORNIA-PACIFIC 
UTILITIES COMP ANY, IS NOT LIABLE FOR CON-
DITIONS EXISTING ON A PUBLIC HIGHWAY 
WHICH IT DID NOT CREATE OR MAINTAIN FOR 
ITS OWN BENEFIT. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH ARE ESSEN-
TIAL TO THE APPELLANT'S RECOVERY MUST BE 
BASED UPON SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE. 
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS BARRED BE-
CAUSE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, SHE WAS 
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND 
VOLUNTARILY ASSUMED A KNOWN RISK. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RESPONDENT, CALIFORNIA-PACIFIC 
UTILITIES COMPANY, IS NOT LIABLE FOR CON-
DITIONS EXISTING ON A PUBLIC HIGHWAY 
WHICH IT DID NOT CREATE OR MAINTAIN FOR 
ITS OWN BENEFIT. 
The duties imposed by law for the maintenance and 
eare of the sidewalk also apply to the parking strip be-
tween the sidewalk and the curib; the parking strip is 
tr«atrd as part of the sidewalk for this purpose. Wood-
so11 r. Metropolitan Street Railway Company, 123 S.vV. 
f\20 (Mo. 1909). The primary duty of maintaining the 
siuewalk rests upon the City of Kanab. In Salt Lake 
City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 159 P.2d 149, 151-152 
( rn-tG), this Court stated: 
"'I'hat the city is charged with the duty of 
maintaining the sidewalks within its limits in a 
safo condition for use in the usual modes by 
pedestrians thereon is so well established as to 
need no citations of authority." 
'rlie evidence in the instant case establishes that the 
(·onerPtP hlock and the small pipe which the appellant 
now holiews mio-ht have caused her fall were located 
0 
11n public property located on the street side of the side-
\1-alk and owrnc'd hy Kanab Cit~- (Tr. 158-159, 160-161). 
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The lia:bility for the condition of a public sidewall( 
is imposed upon a private person only wlwn such person 
creates the danger. In Basinger v. 8tandar.d Furniture 
Co., 118 Utah 121, 220 P.2d 117, 119 (1950), this Comt 
held: 
"There exists no obligation on the part of 
an abutter to keep the sidewalk adjoining hi, 
premises in repair, nor is he lablie for any statP 
of disrepair. His ohligation can only arise. wherr 
he creates through use or otherwise some unsafr 
or dang-erous condition." 
The evidence here demonstrates the fact that the cernPnt 
hlock and the pipe located on the parking strip \dwre 
the appellant fell were not constructed by respondrnt 
Pacific but existed at the time of the lease. Moreover, 
the removal of the pillars and canopy which exposed 
the concrete block was undertaken solely by the respon 
dents Bybee and vVatson, at the insistence of Kanali 
City, without any participation by Pacific. The evidencf' 
establishing these facts is found in the testmony of re-
spondent Bybee, who testified he and \\T atson acquire<l 
the large piece of property in 1955 and leased a portion 
of it, on which the Pacific office \Vas located, in 19J9. 
The canopy and pillars wer0 in plaC'e at the time of tlli' 
l0ase hut tJwv WPI'P not part of the leased pro1wrty and 
when thP city r0quested they be remov0d, the bnildiu~ 
ownPrs complied, without notieP to, cons<>nt hy, or par 
ticivating paynwnt from, Pacific (J1:x. 7, Tr. 143, HJ, 
1 ()1, 1G2). 
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'1111 is evidence establishes that respondent Pacific 
in no way created the alleged hazards, and thus, under 
the holding of the Basinger case cannot be held respon-
sible f 01 any injury caused by the presence of the objects 
on thP parking strip. 
In Solt Lake City v. Schubach, su.pra, the Court in-
dirat(•<l another possible way that liability might shift 
from a city to. a private person. Although such person 
ma.\· not have created the hazardous condition on a pub-
lic side,rnlk, he may still be subject to liability if he 
lWPiVPs eontrol of the hazard and maintains it for his 
h«nefit. 11 he Court clearly defined the circumstances 
Tlf'ePssar.\T for such a shift of liability. The Schubach 
r·nst• involved an action in indemnity by the city against 
thl' property owner and the tenant to recover the amount 
of a .iudgnwnt rendered against the city in favor of the 
m.iun,rl party. The Court held the property owner liable 
on the thPory of implied contract; he was allowed to con-
~:tnwt a sidewalk elevator, which added to the enjoyment 
of l1is land. in consideration for his implied promise that 
ltP \rnn1d properly co,nstruct and maintain it. 
A pp lying the Schubach rule to the facts of the pres-
Pnt <·asp, it is clear that the o-vvner of the property, at 
th(· timp tlu' canopy "·as constructed and the cement 
l11~rn<blions and pillars were installed on city property, 
:md1•ifoo'.~ the dnty of insuring they presented no un-
11 n:-:onnhle risk of harm to the pnhlic. The Court in 
1111 1 .','17.1 ·r?1rrr71 rns0 tlwn w0nt on to definr thr conditions 
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under which this obligation could be transferred. "Only 
by conveying the land, or by leasing it in entirety, ~~1 
that the lessee is then in the shoes of the owner mav he ' . 
escape liability." (Page 157) From this, it is seen that, 
in this case, the obligation undertaken by the owner who 
constructed the canopy passed to the respondf>nts LaMar 
Bybee and O'Dell Watson when they purchased the prop-
(•rty. The obligation remained with them and cxistrd 
at and after the time of the lease to Pacific in 1959. 
The Court in the Sclmbach ease then went on to de-
fine the circumstances under whieh such an obligation 
would pass to a lessee and a judgment in favor of tlw 
city and against the tenant was reversed because thPn 
\Vas no showing that the tenant specifically und('J'took 
the obligation imposed on the owner who constructrrl 
the sidewalk elevator, nor was there implied acceptancP 
of the obligation, since there was no showing that thl' 
tenant had control of the sidewalk elevator. 
Applying the Schuu-ach decision to the present casP. 
it is clear that the tenant in the instant case, respondt>nt 
Pacific, did not have, nor did it undertakl', an;· obliga-
tion concerning sueh hazard as might exist by rE'ason or 
the cPment blocks or the pipe on the public park\n1y: 
it had no control OYl'l' that ground or the ohjects iw 
b(•dded in it, nor did it agrPP to undPrtakE' any obliga 
tion conf'erning them. In fart, thP respondPnts Dylw1 
and 'Wahwn sp('cifieall~- rdained control and an.v obli-
11 
gation ansmg therefrom. This is established by the 
testimony of Mr. Bybee and by the terms of the lease. 
The canopy and the land beneath it were not included 
in the lf·ase; only the building, from the front wall where 
the canopy began, to the rear wall, was leased to Pacific. 
'!'he ]Pase excluded all surrounding property, as is shown 
h>· the following description of the leased premisf"s: 
"That certain building situated on the north 
sidt> of Center StrPet in Kanab, Utah, on Lot 22 
of Block 2, Kanab Townsite Survey, said build-
ing having a frontage of approximately 20 feet 
and a depth of apprnximately 30 feet. Together 
with the right to use the- existing driveway on the 
wPst side of the building and with the right to 
the use of parking and unloading space of ap-
proximately 30 square feet to the rear of said 
building." (Ex. 7) 
In this regard, the lessor and respondent, LaMar 
BYlw0 t<>stified upon cross-examination as follows: . ' 
"Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Mr. Bybee, the property that you are rent-
in o- to California-Pacific is actually just a 
b 
building itself, is it not? 
That's right. 
All rght. Now ... the front and south part 
of the building that they rented stopped north 
of the main side,rnlk line, isn't that true 1 
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A. That's true, yes. 
Q. And the area that we've been concerned with 
here, the blocks and the pipe you say that 
was adjacent to the blocks is south of there 
' of the property that California-Pacifir 
rented; isn't that right - south by several 
feet? 
A. South. 
Q. Out towards the street in other wordsY 
A. Yes. 
Q. It's across the public sidewalk, south of your 
property line and on public property? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And when the city gave notice to you and 
the highway department to take out the can-
opy in the first place, you did that without 
requiring California-Pacific to do any part 
of it, isn't that true? 
A. That's right. 
Q. That was your affair, not theirs, isn't that 
true? Yours as distinguished from Califor-
nia-Pacific~ 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And they also had nothing to do with the 
concrete blocks? They didn't take those out 
did they? ' 
A. No. 
Q. You never gave them any notice to do that 
did you? ' 
A. No, I did not (Tr. 160-162)." 
rrhe testimony of Mr. Bybee further established that 
he and \V atson owned the land immediately west, north 
and east of the building leased to Pacific and that the 
huilcling is therefore· "on front center of a bigger rec-
tangular piece" they owned (Tr. 162). 
Pacific, as lessee, unde·rtook no duty of maintaining 
thp building. That obligation, by the terms of the lease, 
remained with Bybee and Watson, as is shown by the 
ninth clause of the lease: 
"The lessors promise and agree to maintain 
said building and premises at a reasonably good 
state and condition at all times during the terms 
of this lease." (Ex. 7) 
Thr actions of the respective parties subsequent to 
lhe lPasp illustrate thPir intent that Pacific should have 
ahsolutely no control over the canopy and the concrete 
hloelrn. The testimony from the record, as quoted above 
14 
from pages 160-162, estabishes that the removal of thr 
canopy and the later removal of the concrPte blocks wa~ 
accomplished without any consultation, notice or consent 
hy Pacifir. 
This Court in the SchitlJach case further held that an~ 
obligation in rPgard to the sidewalk elevator arose a~ a 
(jllid pro qiw of the hPnefit confNred upon the owmr 
hy its existPnCP. TherP is no evidence in the instaJ1t 
rasf' that the canopy or the pipP in any way henditfrd 
Pacific or was used hy it in its husinPss opPration. 
'rhe removal of the canopy and pillars PXIJosed the 
C'('ment blocks, which created a more dangerous con<l;-
tion than thP pillars, since the blocks were not as easil)-
ohsPrved. Further, the removal of tlw pillars madf:' ac-
cess to the pipe f'asier, and thus increased the likelihood 
of a pedestrian using the parking strip to trip owr the 
pipe. The fact that the canopy and pillars were removed 
at the rPquest of the city is a very significant fact. 
In Otten v. Bi_q Lake Ice Company, 270 N.W. 13~ 
(Minn. 1936), an ice company was engaged in hauling 
irP across thP highway to various dPlivery points in the 
Hl"PU. rrhe COUTity desired to makP the highway safrr. 
and paid th<· dt>frndant ic<:> compan~T to construct a tunnvl 
nnd<>r the highway to nse in hauling· its ice. 'rhe plain-
tiff, while walking along tlw highway, f Pll into the f:'~w1 -
vation which cmnprisP<l part of tlw rompl<:>ted tunrll'l 
lG 
The court held that the ice company was not liable for 
the dangerous condition created by the tunnel because 
it \ms the county's project and they alone were liable 
for the safety of thE> highways. 
In Hlnck vs. Southern Pacific Cornpany, 12 P.2d 981 
(Calif. 19:12), a city widened the street, but the railroad 
rornpany failed to widen, to the same extent, the space 
lwlwem its signal devices at a railroad crossing located 
on the street. The plaintiff collided with a signal device 
\1·l1ile traveling along the widened portion of the street. 
'J'lte eourt held the railroad company was not liable for 
tl1P injury since the condition was crf'ated by a project 
0f' tlH• eit;.·, Pven though the injury involved a device 
IH~longing to the railroad. The court stated: 
"And while in the present case the co.ndition 
in which the street was left after the improve-
mmts were made was likely to mislead travelers 
as to the width of the crossing, this condition was 
not created by the railroad company or upon its 
property, and it was under no duty to warn of 
tlte danger of deviating from the established crnss-
in;~·; nor as between the company and the plain-
tiffs was there any duty to fence its right of way 
along the newly paved portion of the high"'ay." 
(Page 98()) 
In tli<' pn•sent case, any danger that was created 
\\'Ctc.: i11ci<1<·nt to a eity project, \\-a.s created at the request 
uf 1 lit• cit;.r, existed on property owned by the city, and 
i 1111c- 11 ns tlw cit>·'s responsibility. It most cNtainly was 
16 
not the responsibility of respondent Pacifir, which wa' 
merely a tt>nant of a building on the otlwr side of tlw 
public sidewalk. 
Appellant cites Kanab City Revised Ordinances, 
Sec. 18-1, in an attempt to persuade this Court to USP 
it as a measure of the respondents' conduct. There are 
several reasons why th!? ordinanrE' is inapplicable. to 
respondent Parifi<:>. 
First, the ordinance, by its terms, applies only to 
one who places or permits the plaeement of the itrrns 
mentioned. The testimony previously quoted establishP' 
that Pacific did not place the pipe or cement blocks on 
the parking, nor did it have control of the canopy ~n 
as to 1wnnit their placement or removal. 
Secondly, the ordinance applies only when the ikrn' 
are placed on the sidewalk without the permission of thv 
city. The ahove-quot0d testimony 0stablishes that tht' 
exposure of the cement blocks was not only permitted, 
but requestE>d hy the city. 
Thirdly, it is usually held that sueh ordinances ar" 
not to hP ust>d as a standard of rarP. Daly v. JJ!atth1'//'•, 
122 P.2d 81(Calif.19-1-2); W. 1'. Grant Co. v. Casady, l~' 
P.2d 8Sl (Colo. 19-1-8); Kinq v. J. Ji,'. GroslJie, 131 P~rl 
105 (Okla. El-1-2). 
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POINT II. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH ARE ESSEN-
TIAL TO THE APPELLANT'S RECOVERY MUST BE 
BASED UPON SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE. 
The facts necessary to the appellant's recove,ry are 
not supported by solid evidence, but only upon specula-
tion and conjecture. She does not know how far she 
had walked when she fell; she may not have even been 
in the vicinity of the block or the pipe. She does not 
know what she fell over, whether it was a rock, a rut or 
incline, a cement hlock, or the pipe or a combination of 
these. 
Tn addition to her testimony, quoted earlier in this 
brief in the Statement of Facts, there are numerous 
instances in the record indicating the uncertain and 
speculative nature of appellant's evidence. For example, 
she was shown a photograph of the area, Exhibit A, 
and was then asked: 
"Q. And I presume you do not know where you 
fell~ 
A. No, I don't." (Tr. 43) 
Although she had been uncertain of it upon deposi-
tion, appellant concluded at the trial that she had safely 
iwgotiated the curb, but she did not know what happened 
from that point, saying: 
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" ... I stepped out onto the curb and tlwn J 
stumbled over something, hut I don't know what 
thing" (Tr.44). 
Slw could not state at what point she stumbled aftpr 
r losing- the ear door: 
''Q. But from there on out you don't knmv whetlwr 
you took one step, or five steps from thP 
car, or ho\\"ever many in hetwePn; isn't that 
true1 
A. Right. 
Q. And you don't know whether it was your Mt 
foot or your right foot or whatever it was 
you did; isn't that true~ 
A. Yes." (Tr. 57) 
The possible alternative causes of the appellant's 
fall have varying legal effects. If she tripped ovrr a 
rock, there is no liability on the part of any of thP r~­
spondents, O'K eefe v. Berry Co., 42 N.l'J. 2d 267 (Mas~. 
1942); if sht> trippP<l ovf'r a rise or rut in the parkin.L' 
strip, then the only possible liability ·would he upon th" 
city, Rnsinqer v. Stnndrrrd Fur11it1we Co., su7Jrn. 
Moreover, the placement of liability would var;. 
depending on v\'ht>tlwr the appellant tripped over tlw 
eprnent blocks or tlw JlipP, sine<> tlw pipt> in no way benl' 
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t'ited the property to give rise to an obligation on the 
part of the owner in favor of the city, under the ruling 
in the Schubach case, whereas there may have been such 
a benefit in regard to the canopy. However, in neither 
rvent would there be responsibility upon Pacific, the 
tenant here. 
As a further indication of the speculative nature of 
appellant's proof as against this respondent, there is 
some C(Uestion as to whether the pipe (if that was what, 
in fact, appellant stumbed over) was even located on the 
land abutting the front of the building Pacific had leased. 
TltC're is testimony indicating it was east of an extension 
of the east wall of the building and, if so, it would have 
lwun on land abutting the vacant lot owned by respon-
dPnts Bybee and Watson (Tr. 146). 
~1his Court has held that in cases where there are 
alternative theories of what caused an accident, and no 
rational basis upon which to choose between them, so 
that liability varies depending on the alternatives, re-
coypry must be denied. In the case of Tremelling v. 
8011thern Pacific Co., 51 U. 189, 170 P. 80 (1917), ap-
1wal after remand, 70 U. 72, 257 P. 1066 (1927), the 
plaintiff's intestate was riding on a train as a brake-
!11an, arnl was later found dead, lying next to a car on 
an adjaernt track. His dE'ath had bE'en caused by a severe 
'lrnll fracture. The plaintiff alleged that the skull frac-
(\ll'i, was caused hy the deceased striking his head against 
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a stPel car on the adjacent track, and that tlw car had 
hePn negligently left in that position hy the defendanl. 
The defendant contended that the plaintiff's allegation 
was based on pure conjecture, that it was possihlr tha: 
the deceas<>d's skull had been fracturPd by his falling and 
striking tlw frozen ground. This Court held that H1 
plaintiff must fail since tlwre was no rational ha~i' 
npon which the jury could choose h<>tween the two alt~1-
natives. It said: 
'' ... Tlw rule is well estahlislwd that wlwn· 
an accident occurs through an alh~ged neglig«m1 
of one person which rPsults in injury or dmnag1· 
to another, and the injurPd person seeks to n· 
cover damages, and it i.,; madP to appear that t]1, 
accident mav have bPen occasionPd bv one of tw11 
or sPvPral c~uses, and that the perso~ complainPd 
of is responsible only for one of them, th<'n th1 
burden is on the plaintiff to show that the acciden1 
and rPsulting damages ·were produced b)· the can,, 
for which the person complained of is responsihk 
and in rase of a failure to ~·stablish such a fact. 
the plaintiff mnst fail in the action. In 29 Cyr' 
Ci25, it is said: 'Th<> evidenet> must, however, rl 11 
mor<' than mPrelv raise a eoniectnn~ or shmr '1 
proliahilit)· as to· tlw ca US<' of tlw injury, and 11 11 
recowrv ean lw had if the evidmce lraws it t" 
conjt>ch~re which of two probable eansrs r<'sulted 
in tlH' injury, wlwrp dPfrndant was liahlr for onl 
mw of thPn1.'" (170 P. at 8:::) 
In t}w sarne <'US<', on appeal after n•mand, the Corn 
quotP<l the aho,·<· stat<•rnPnt aµ:ain and add('d: 
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"Respondent quotes from numerous adjudi-
eated cases, all more or less in point, to the effect 
that no legitimate inference can be drawn that an 
accident happened in a certain way by simply 
showing that it might have happened in that way, 
without further showing that it could not reason-
ably have happened in any other way. Tested by 
this rule plaintiff in the instant case failed to 
riroYe defendant's liability for the accident." (257 
P. at 1074.) 
The doctrine of the Trernelling case was reaffinne<l 
in Sumsion v. Streater-Srnith, Inc., 103 U. 44, 132 P.2d 
r;so (19-t-:n, and Devine v. Cook, 3 U 2d 134, 279 P.2d 
107~ ( 1955). Thus, appellant failed to establish a case 
and thP trial court's ruling was correct because appellant 
pn'sented possible alternative causes of her injury with-
out any basis in the evidence to choose between one or 
the other. 
Tlit; appellant argues that an injured plaintiff may 
go hark to the scene of the accident and there reconstruct 
th(· \'VPnts and conclude how her injury occurred. How-
C'YPr, it is difficult to see how, in this case, that would 
in any way decrease the speculative nature of the cause 
of tlw aJJpellant's injury. Since the appellant has no 
icli->a of how far she walked before she fell or any recol-
1·(·ti(ln of tlw ohject over which she fell, there is no way 
lo iw·onstrnct the chain of events to permit even a cal-
1 ulatt>(l glwss as to the cause of her injury. If the 
:lpJH·llant (10<'S not know how far she traveh~d before she 
fell, admits the positive £>xistence of two ohj£>cts eitlwr 
of which could have caused her fall, admits thP possihlP 
existence of other objects often found on parking strip:-; 
which could have caused her fall, it is impossible tr 
determine, outside of pure speculation, the cause of lw1 
fall. 
Several eases are cited in support of app<>llant\ 
theory that she may return to the scene of the accid('nt 
and speculate as to the cause of her fall. The appellant 
first makes a general reference to the entire record of 
th€' trial on remand in the case of Spencer 11 • Salt Lak1 
City, 17 U. 2d 362, 412 P. 2d 449. However, the record 
<loes not support the appellant's argument. The r\•co.rd 
establishes that the plaintiff in that case went back to 
the scPne of the accident, but her visit was not to ascer-
tain the cause of her fall. On the contrary, there is no 
indication in the record that she was in doubt as to tht-
cause of her fall and, instead, there is affirmative evi-
dence in the record that she ascertained the cause of 
her fall at the time it occurred: "I don't remember seeing 
any raised sidewalk until I tripped." (Emphasis added.) 
(Record, Spencrr 'V, Salt Lake City, p. 98.) 
The appellant also cites Hunt v. Tooele City, 8 U. 2d 
323, 334 P.2d 555, as supporting her argummt. How-
ever, after reading that opinion, this rPspondent ha~ 
failed to find any support for the appdlant's argument. 
r:l'lw ohjPet OV<'l' which tlw plaintiff fell in that cHSl' 
was ascertained at the time she fell, and there was abso-
lutely no evidence nor was there even a hint that she 
went back to the scene and made the determination. 
Finally, the appellant cites Tom v. Days of '47, Inc., 
1G U. 2d 38G, 401 P.2d 946. This case likewise does not 
support the appellant's argument. In the Tom case, there 
was evidence, based upon expert testimony, upon which 
tlw finder of fact could reasonhly exclude one of the 
two alternative causes of the accident involved in that 
cast>. There is no such evidence in the instant case. 
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS BARRED BE-
CAUSE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, SHE WAS 
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND 
VOLUNTARILY ASSUMED A KNOWN RISK. 
The judgment of the trial court should be upheld 
because the appellant, as a matter of law, was guilty 
of contributory negligence or voluntarily assumed a 
known risk. The evidence estabishes that she was well 
awan• of the existenct' of the cement block and the pipe, 
t]1p objects which she now is sure she tripped over. She 
1Pstifiecl as follows: 
"(~. Mrs. 1\lcAllister, this ~was clear, bright clay, 
was it? 
A. Yes, it was. 
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Q. And I suppose you had occasion to go to. tltP 
bank many times in the years precPding this 
accident, haven't you? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. As I recall, I think you told us that the acci-
dent happened about 9 :15 in the morning? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had seen those concrete blocks thrrP 
lwfore, haven't you~ 
A. YPs. (Tr. 43) 
''Q. And you knew the cement block was there. 
You had seen that lots of times, hadn't you 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there was no reason you knew of why 
you didn't see it. There's nothing to kePp yon 
from sPeing it? 
A. No." (Tr. 50) 
Despite the appPllant 's knowledge of the obstacles iu 
the parking strip, she nevt'rtlwlt>ss chost~ to cross owl' 
them instead of walking around them. FurtlwrrnorP, h('r 
ey(:'sight was sn<'h that sht> admitted slw could "s<'e [WI'· 
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fcdly well without glasses so far as walking is con-
1·Prnecl." (Tr. 50, lines 22-24.) There was nothing to 
d1straet her attention as she crossed ovf'r tlwse known 
dangPrs: 
"Q. "Was thf're anything in the street that dis-
tract<>d yon, Mrs. :McAllister? 
A. No. 
Q. Any nois0? 
A. Xo. 
Q. Any littlP kids running down thf' st red? 
A. Xo. 
Q. And how ahout the sudden noise of an auto-
mobile horn, did you hear that? 
A. Xo. 
Q. Anybody yPll at you, \Yishing you good morn-
ing'? 
. \. 
Q. 
X o, not that I lrnm\· of . 
X ot a single r<'ason why you couldn't have 
<·oneentrated on the business of walking from 
your rar diagonall.v owr to the hank; is that 
t l'll<' '! 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
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Did you understand that quPstion? 
Is there anv reason vou know of now wll\· 
you could ~ot have kept your attention o~ 
the husiness of getting from your car, out of 
your car, across tlw area to thP door of tlw 
hank? 
No.'' (Tr. 51-52) 
Despite the appt•Ilant's ad('quate eyesight and tlw 
absPnce of any distractions, she obviously was not watch-
ing out for tlw known dangers sine<:' she has no idea of 
whPre she was in rplation to these dangers wh0n she 
fell or whether she fell over these known dangers or 
some other object. 
In such circumstances, this Court has repeated!~· 
found contributory negligence as a matter of law. Th·· 
casP of Colr 'l'. Klorpfrr, 123 U. 4:52, 2GO P.2d 518 ( 19:SJ ). 
involves facts very similar to those in this case. rr'lw 
defendant caused several large ce11wnt blocks to protrn<k 
about thn•p inches ahovP thP snrfaee of the sidPwalk. 
The plaintiff lived n<'ar th0 ar<>a w}wr<• this existed and. 
having occasion frequently to pass over it, was "·"JI 
awarP of' its existent'<'. ~ ev<>rtl1Pl<'~~s, th<• Jllainti f'f d10' 1 
10 cross over the defect and was injured by tripping 
ovPr tlw protruding cement blocks. It was held that since 
tlH• accident occurred in hroad daylight and there was 
nothing which substantially distracted her attention from 
the known danger, she was contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law. 
1'lw Col(' case is even strongPr against appellant's 
position because, in that case, plaintiff at least had 
s011H' explanation for diverting her attention from ·where 
~h<' was going whereas, here, as has been demonstrated, 
thPre was ahsolutely no such element. 
In the recPnt case of Tlli.r;htman v. BPttlyon's, Inc., 
1:> (T. 2d 200, 390 P.2d 120 (1964), the plaintiff 'vas in-
jured ,,·hpn she> fell over vegetation which covered th<' 
rnrfare of the sidewalk. 1'he court held that she was 
lll'gligent as a matter of law since she was well aware 
of tlH' existencP of the-w~eds over the sidewalk but never-
thPl<>ss chose to encounter them. 
In Wl1itm.rf'l1 ·u. TV. 1'. Grrrnt Co., 16 F. 2d 81, 395 P.2d 
918 (1964), the Court statPd: 
"Tl1P pla;ntiff is confront<'d with the basic 
proposition that \vherP then• is a hazard whirh is 
plainly visihh•, ordinarily one is charged with the 
duh· of S<'eirw and avoiding it. And if he fails to . ,...., 
do so, it is concluded that lw was negligent either 
in failin<r to look or in failing- to hped what .~ ' ' 
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h0 saw .... In order to just!(\- holding that a 
jury question as to negligPnce exists, wherp injun 
has resultPd from an ohsPrval1le hazard, it i·, 
essential that tlwre be so11wthing which c.ould Jw 
r<'garcled as tPncling to distract the plaintiff's nt-
t<>ntion or to prevPnt him from s0eing the dang(·r, 
tlrns providing somp reasonable hasis for a firnl-
ing that <•ven though he exPrcisecl clue ear<>, lw 
could lw PXCUS('d from sPeing and avoiding it.'· 
(P. 920) 
In EsPrni.a v. Ovcrla11d lllm.·ing Co., 115 U. 519, '..:!llli 
P.2d 621 (1949), which \\TaR a case dissimilar on its farts 
hut similar on principl0, this Court held that w]H'l'<' th1· 
Pvidence shows that a plaintiff knows of a specific clan-
g<>r, and has a chancP to avoid it, but choosPs not t11 
avoid it, he is contributorily n0gligent as a matter of law. 
l\f Ol'POVE'r, tlw fads of thiR CUSP establish that tlll' 
ap1wllant voluntarily assumed a known risk and thm 
her recovery should he barred. In Ferguson v. Jongsma, 
10 P. 2d 179, 350 P.2d 404 (1960), this Court statPd: 
''Assumption of risl;: requirPs knmdPd!2,'<' b1 
plaintiff of a speci fie d0f ect or dangProus condi-
tion causPd hy defendant's negligence or ]n('k of 
dn<' can• whieh plaintiff could havP, hut volnn-
tarilv and dPiiherat<>lv failPcl to avoid and tJipn•lJ\ 
assn~1wd th<• risk of tlw injuriPR lw sustained." 
ThC' aetions of thP appellant in thP instant emw foil 
pn•cisPly within thi;;.; <ldinition of assmnption of l'i:-:k. 
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Tlw Court further stated that both assumption of 
ri~k and contributory n<>glig(•nce follow as a matter of 
law if: 
" ... the evidence was so conclusive on those 
questions that a finding otherwisP would be un-
r<>asonable." 
In Wold v. Ogden City, 123 U. 270, 258 P.2d 453 
( 1D;):3), the plaintiff was awan' of a large trench which 
1•\isted in the street in front of his home. Nevertheless, 
hr' voluntarily chosP a path over it and then straddled 
'ii!' trench to help his wife over it. The sides of the 
tr<'nch gave way, causing him to fall and sustain injury. 
This Court affirmed a dismissal, entered after the open-
111µ; stat<'lllPnt by plaintiff's counsel, on the grounds that . 
thP plaintiff "·as guilty of contributory negligence and 
lw voluntarily assumed a knO\vn risk, both of whieh 
WPre apparent as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Ti> hold respondent Pacific liable in this case would 
hp thP <'quivalPnt of the imposition of strict liabiliity for 
1·nnditions on public sidewalks and parking strips be-
1111·<·11 si<l<>walb~ and curbing. 'rlie creation of the instru-
111«ntalities that may have caused the appellant's fall 
;1n1l !lit> alt<,rntion of th<>s<' instrummtaitiPs which made 
tlt1·rn 111on' ha.7'ardons wPre solPly the work of the prior 
•11q11'J' of thP prop<'rt>· and of tlw othPr respond(>nts. 
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Pacific was in no way invo.lved. Responsibility, if any, 
should lie upon those who creatP the hazard, not upon 
an unassociated third party. 
The lower court's judgment should be affirmed he-
rause the appellant did not sustain her burden of proof. 
She attempts to leave the cause of her fall to speculation 
and conjecture. The record contains no evidence upon 
which a jury could properly ascertain the cause of her 
fall and the possible alternatives vary the possible lia-
bility. 
Regardless of possible alternative causes, appellant 
should be barred from recovery against all respondent' 
because the evidence· clearly establishes, as a matter of 
law, that her own negligence contributed to her injury, 
and she voluntarily assumed a known risk. 
There was, therefore, ample basis for the trial court's 
ruling and it should be affirmed. 
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